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Another 9/11: Lessons from the 1973 Coup in Chile – Part 2

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By Democratic Socialists of America

Jorge A. Lawton

To mark the 41st anniversary of the military coup that overthrew Salvador Allende’s democratically elected socialist government in Chile, we’re pleased to post the second article in a two-part series by Jorge A. Lawton. — Ed.

By Jorge A. Lawton

Key Factors in Allende’s Overthrow

There has been a long and largely inconclusive academic debate over which factors were more influential in the overthrow of Allende’s Popular Unity (Unidad Popular, UP) government on Sept. 11, 1973. The question is usually put in terms of the relative influence of external vs. internal opposition factors.

We know that the most significant and visible actor in provoking the coup was, of course, the betrayal of the Chilean armed forces: Army, Navy, Air Force, and Carabiñeros or National Police, plus their various respective, and competing, intelligence services. The CIA., the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the NSA were far less forthcoming with the investigating Senate Church Committee, when it came to questions of the degree and nature of U.S. covert involvement at the time of the 9/11 coup itself, than with some of the details on the earlier covert U.S. intervention programs. That the coup culminated three years of unrelenting pressure and propaganda economically, politically, psychologically and militarily is often conveniently overlooked, as it is seen as an isolated event. Even so, serious questions continue to be raised regarding the likely continuation of the United States’ intimate role, but in a far less visible or considerably more discrete deployment on the day of the coup itself. Some critics have charged that the U.S. Airforce deployed two highly sophisticated aircraft, similar to AWACs, with orders to maintain a centralized military communication system far above the capital city of Santiago, just in case the Chilean military’s closely coordinated monopoly of all ground communications should suffer any unforeseen glitches.

Source: Another 9/11: Lessons from the 1973 Coup in Chile – Part 2